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DYNAMIC EXTENSIONS FOR THE LOGIC OF KNOWING WHY WITH PUBLIC
ANNOUNCEMENTS OF FORMULAS
NICHOLAS PISCHKE
Abstract. In this paper, we address the logic of knowing why, an example of a non-standard epistemic logic
dealing with justified knowledge via a new epistemic operator, under the extensions with ideas from dynamic
epistemic logic, namely public announcements. Through the additional notions present in the knowing why
context, we consider two possible variants, namely the extensions by (i): public announcements of a formula
and by (ii): public announcements of reasons, although the deeper analysis of the latter is left for future work.
We consider another logical operator, the conditional knowing-why operator, for which we study the applications
to the axiomatization of public announcements as well as the solely framework. At the end, we consider the
logical expressivity of these different logics in comparison to each other, and thus we show one of the main
problems with the usual process of proving completeness through translation in the context of logics with public
announcements.
1. Introduction
The logic of knowing why, as introduced by Xu, Wang and Studer in [17], considers a synthesis of ideas very
similar to justification logic together with the classical notions of epistemic logic to provide a framework for
reasoning not only about knowing formulas but also knowing why in the concrete sense of knowing explanations
for formulas in all concerned worlds of an agent. For this, the authors introduced a new modal operator Kya
in extension to the basic epistemic framework. In contrast to justification logics however, the knowing-why
operator is inherently unexplicit about the actual reasons in concerned situations.
The logic of knowing why is located in the framework of ideas for extensions of basic epistemic logic by
more graded notions knowing, e.g. knowing who, knowing how, etc., so called non-standard epistemic logics,
originating in Hintikka’s serminal work [4] and its sequels and again emerging as a subject of other recent
contributions to epistemic logics, see e.g. [13]. This synthesis of knowing and knowing why can also be found in
other, conceptually different realizations, like in the context of justification logics in combination with standard
epistemic logic as e.g. in [1]. Such a framework, capable of analyzing origins of agents knowledge deeper,
promises interesting applications, especially after an enhancement by dynamic notions, in a same way as for
these related systems, like in classical dynamic epistemic logic and e.g. for justification logic by Renne in e.g.
[6], [8] and [7]. Although dynamic epistemic logic encompasses many different notions and systems, we focus
on the concept of public announcements for the extension. While originally introduced by Plaza in his seminal
work [5], we will manly adapt, and refer to, the presentation in the monograph [10].
As there are two different kinds of notions concerned, namely solely knowing and knowing why(or knowing
reasons) we also can imagine two notions of public announcements from this context. Either publicly announc-
ing that a formula has to hold or even publicly announcing why a formula has to hold. We will only examine the
first concept in this paper, i.e. an enhancement of the logic of knowing why with a classical public announcement
operator for formulas is considered. The second one could then follow the ideas and concepts presented by Eijck,
Gattinger and Wang in [11]. We then find that, in difference to usual ehancements by public announcement
operators, the logic of knowing why bears some deeper semantical idiosyncrasies in cooperation with these
notions, making a classical, that is in the context of public announcements a reduction style axiomatization
impossible as they add expressive power. We then introduce a relativized version of the knowing-why operator,
following suggestions made in [17], to provide a possible workaround for these problems. As a main goal, we
provide an axiomatization of this latter logic which is then proved sound and complete with respect to the basic
model classes presented in the original paper.
We then provide expressivity comparisons between the logic incorporating public announcements and the logic
using the relativized knowing why operator. Together with this, we again address the issues with axiomatizing
these different logics in a reduction sense.
Key words and phrases. epistemic logic, logic of knowing why, dynamic logic, public announcement logic.
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2. Preliminaries
The main purpose of this section is to provide an overview of the work done about the logic of knowing why,
by Xu et. al. in [17], to create a common ground on which the dynamic extensions and other modifications later
take place. For the following, it’s assumed that the reader is familiar with the basic notions of propositional
classical modal logic, Kripke-frames and the concepts of basic epistemic logic.
2.1. The logic of knowing why. The underlying language for the logic of knowing why, in the following
denoted by ELKy in correspondence to the initial paper, is defined with the BNF
LELKy : φ ::= p | ¬φ | (φ ∧ φ) | Kaφ | Kyaφ
with p ∈ P and a ∈ A. The sets P and A used here are respectively the sets for the atomic propositions, being
countably infinite, and the countable set of agents. All other common connectives like →, ↔ as well as ⊥ and
⊤ are defined in the same way as in classical propositional logic. Following the general notations of epistemic
logic, the dual of the modal operator Ka is defined as K̂aφ = ¬Ka¬φ. As it follows naturally, while Ka reads
like the agent a knows ... is the case, the new modal operatorKya read like the agent a knows why ... is the case.
The semantics of the logic ELKy was defined in a classical modal model-theoretic sense with following the
approach of Fitting models for justification logic. These originated in [3] as a natural extension to the approach
of a possible-world Kripke model in the context of classical modal logic, enhanced by additional functions to
model local, that is world-specific, relationships between explanations and formulas. Followingly, an ELKy-
model M = 〈W,E, {Ra | a ∈ A}, E , V 〉 is defined over (i) a non-empty set of worlds W , also called the domain
D(M) of M, (ii) a non-empty set of explanations E, (iii) an own accessibility relation Ra ⊆ W ×W for each
agent a ∈ A, (iv) an admissible explanation function E : E×LELKy → 2W
1 and (v) a basic evaluation function
V : P → 2W . A pointed version of a model, i.e. a combination of a model and a designated world is then
denoted by (M, w).
As it was defined in the initial paper, the set E, holding the possible explanations for formulas, has to
satisfy two conditions, namely (1) holding a designated explanation e and (2) being closed under a explanation-
combination operator · : E ×E → E, i.e. s, t ∈ E implying (s · t) ∈ E. With E being independent of an agents
view, it can be seen as an omnipresent domain of explanations.
The explanation function E , relating the worlds w ∈ W to a formula φ and an explanation s, in the sense
of s being an explanation of φ at some world w, also has to fulfill two conditions about its behavior, namely
(1) whenever a formula φ is in a designated set Λ, it holds that E(e, φ) =W and (2) the function E distributes
over ·-application in combination with a modus ponens style inference with E(s, φ→ ψ)∩ E(t, φ) ⊆ E((s · t), ψ).
This designated set Λ, introduced by the authors in the original paper, is called the tautology ground, simply a
set consisting of valid formulas, which represent a fixed argumentation ground for all agents which are regarded
as self-evidently true.2 This stands in similarity with constant specifications in justification logics, and in a
concrete sense, it helps the agents to make more justified conclusions.
The accessibility relation Ra for each agent a is in the following required to be a so called S5 relation, i.e.
being (i) reflexive, that is for all w, (w,w) ∈ Ra, (ii) transitive, that is for all w, u, v, if (w, u) ∈ Ra and
(u, v) ∈ Ra, then (w, v) ∈ Ra and (iii) symmetric, that is for all w, u, if (w, u) ∈ Ra then (u,w) ∈ Ra. Although
in the realm of modal logics there are many other classes of frames and models of particular interest, defined
e.g. over different restrictions of the accessibility relations, the main emphasis will be on those S5 models.3
Local satisfiability, that is the validity of a formula in a specific world w of a model M, is then recursively
defined over the relation |= with
(M, w) |= p iff w ∈ V (p) (M, w) |= ¬φ iff (M, w) 6|= φ
(M, w) |= φ ∧ ψ iff (M, w) |= φ and (M, w) |= ψ (M, w) |= Kaφ iff ∀v ∈W : (w, v) ∈ Ra implies (M, v) |= φ
for the classical operators from epistemic logic, and with
(M, w) |= Kyaφ iff (1): (M, w) |= Kaφ and (2): ∃t ∈ E : ∀v ∈ W : (w, v) ∈ Ra implies that v ∈ E(t, φ)
1Note that, in general for a set X, we identify 2X with the power set of X.
2Following from this, the special explanation e is called the self-evident explanation.
3Note, that the corresponding class of models is denoted by KyS5, while the basic class of models with no restrictions for the
accessibility relations is simply denoted by Ky.
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for the new operator Kya. The case of a formula being valid in all worlds w of a model M is simply denoted
by M |= φ.
The notions for local semantic deduction of a formula φ from a set of formulas Γ in a specific model class M,
Γ |=M φ, as well as the formal proof in a Hilbert-style axiomatic system S, Γ ⊢S φ, are defined as usual in the
context of modal propositional logics.
In [17], the authors proposed an axiomatic system, the system SKY shown below, for which they’ve proved
soundness and completeness with respect to local semantic deduction in the class of all S5-ELKy-models defined
as above.4
Definition 1. The system SKY is given by the following axioms and rules:
(PT ) : the classical propositional axioms
(K) : Ka(φ→ ψ)→ (Kaφ→ Kaψ)
(Ky) : Kya(φ→ ψ)→ (Kyaφ→ Kyaψ)
(T ) : Kaφ→ φ
(4) : Kaφ→ KaKaφ
(5) : ¬Kaφ→ Ka¬Kaφ
(PS) : Kyaφ→ Kaφ
(4Y K) : Kyaφ→ KaKyaφ
(MP ) : From φ and φ→ ψ, infer ψ
(NK) : From ⊢ φ, infer ⊢ Kaφ
(NKy) : From φ ∈ Λ, infer ⊢ Kyaφ
3. Public announcements of formulas
As the main topic of this paper, we will now consider the logic of knowing why under the extensions with the
operator for public announcements of formulas. The basic notions of this new operator are defined according
to the common notions of classical public announcement logic PA. We will denote this new logic with PAFKy
where PAF emphasizes the announcement of formulas additionally.
Definition 2. For a countable set of agents A, a countably infinite set of atomic propositions P , the language
of the logic PAFKy is defined with
LPAFKy : φ ::= p | ¬φ | (φ ∧ φ) | Kaφ | Kyaφ | [φ]φ
where p ∈ P and a ∈ A.
Verbally, the construct [φ]ψ translates to “after the public announcement of the formula φ, ψ holds“. The
semantics of this augmented logic are again defined over the same S5-relational knowing-why models M, being
constructed as presented in the preliminaries. We extend the satisfaction relation |= for the handling of this
new operator with
(M, w) |= [φ]ψ iff (M, w) |= φ implies (M|φ,w) |= ψ
The construct (M|φ,w) represents the pointed version of an updated model, M|φ, with the following construc-
tion.
Definition 3. The modelM after the public announcement of φ, M|φ = 〈W ′, E, {R′a | a ∈ A}, E
′, V ′〉, is defined
with
W ′ = {w ∈W | (M, w) |= φ}
R′a = Ra ∩ (W
′ ×W ′) f.a. a ∈ A
V ′(p) = V (p) ∩W ′ f.a. p ∈ P
E ′(t, φ) = E(t, φ) ∩W ′ f.a. t ∈ E, φ ∈ LPAFKy
Note, that E from the previous model is not changed in the “update“ process, as we view the set of ex-
planations as disconnected from the classical Kripkean part of the model, being omnipresent in a given larger
context and only interacting with the possible-worlds part of the model via the function E . For the right
hand definition of W ′, we will write JφKM in the following. One can also imagine the operator | for the up-
date of a model by a publicly announced formula φ as the application of a function | : KyS5×LPAFKy → KyS5.
4The presentation of the theorems and corresponding proofs are omitted here(s. Theorem 13 and Theorem 23 in [17]).
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The corresponding dual to this operator [φ] is denoted by 〈φ〉 and semantically defined by the following:
(M, w) |= 〈φ〉ψ iff (M, w) |= φ and (M|φ,w) |= ψ
Due to a theorem of Plaza [5], it is well known that public announcements in the context of classical epistemic
logic do not add expressive power. Moreover, there is a process to reduce constructs of the form [φ]ψ to equiv-
alent compounds of basic epistemic modal formulas.
Followingly, a major result is the axiomatization of the classical public announcement logic PA with a
reduction-style Hilbert calculus. It immediately arises as a natural question whether this property can be re-
covered in the context of knowing why.
For the purpose of a better insight to the problem, we consider the following expansion of the semantic
evaluations of a formula of the form [φ]Kyaψ.
Let M and w ∈W be arbitrary:
(M, w) |= [φ]Kyaψ ⇔
(M, w) |= φ implies (M|φ,w) |= Kyaψ ⇔
(M, w) |= φ implies ((M|φ,w) |= Kaψ and ∃t ∈ E : ∀v ∈W
′ : (w, v) ∈ R′a implies v ∈ E
′(t, ψ))
From this equivalences, we suppose that there is no basic formula in the language of the logic ELKy which is
able to express this matter equally over a reduction into a compound of more simple epistemic formulas, e.g.
via pushing the announcements further into the formula, since modifying ψ results in some problems concerning
the integrity of E in the evaluation, which focuses on the syntactic structure of the concerned formula. We
concretize this assumption through the following theorem.
Theorem 1. PAFKy is more expressive than ELKy.
Proof. We sketch the model-theoretic considerations. Since PAFKy is an extension of ELKy, it can’t be less
expressive. Now, consider the following two models M1, M2.
For M1, we consider a set of worlds containing two elements w1, w2, we assume that E contains two basic
elements s, t besides the usual conditions, Ra is expected to be total for all agents a. For E , we set E(s, p) =
{w1}, E(t, p) = {w2} while the rest are set to ∅. For the basic evaluation function V , we finally set V (p) =
{w1, w2} and V (q) = {w1}. Visually, this model may be imagined as the following:
p, q
s : p
w1
p
t : p
w2
a
Suppose that M1 is a submodel of M2. Therefore, we will only mention the additional settings. We consider
an augmented set of worlds by a third world w3, together with a third contained basic explanation r ∈ E. Ra
is still considered to be total for all agents and we additionally require E(r, p) = {w3} and V (p) = {w1, w2, w3},
V (q) = {w1, w3}. We may imagine this second model in a slightly reduced representation as:
p, q
s : p
w1
p
t : p
w2
p, q
r : p
w3
a
a
In PAFKy, we may distinguish these model through the formula [q]Kyap in the designed world w1 contained
in both models. For M1, we find that the only world left after the announcement made in w1 is w1 itself
which provides (M1, w1) |= [q]Kyap. For M2, we find that W
q
2 = {w1, w3} after the announcement. Through⋂
t∈E E2(t, p) = ∅, we find that 6 ∃t ∈ E : ∀v ∈W
q
2 : v ∈ E(t, p), i.e. (M2, w1) 6|= [q]Kyap.
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To show that there exists no φ ∈ LELKy which can distinguish between the reasons from only w1 and w3, we
suppose the opposite. If so, then φ = q → Θ for some Θ ∈ LELKy. By q used in the implication, we exclude the
case of q being un-announceable in w1. By the semantics of [q]Kyap, Θ would then have to model the behavior
of (M|q, w1) |= Kyap, i.e. the behavior of Kyap restricted to all q-worlds.
By a simple induction on the structure of Θ, it can be seen that no such formula exists, since to express
something about the reasons of p in reachable worlds, the only possibility is to include Kyap as some subformula
which itself can not be limited to some subset of worlds over the use of ¬,∧,Ka or Kya(which form the induction
steps). 
It became apparent that although the sub-case [φ]Kaψ is expressible over an adequate translation, we have
no other possibility of expressing something concerning the explanation function E than the operator Kyaψ and
for this purpose, there can be no modification of ψ as it would mess with the before mentioned integrity of E by
changing the concerned formula for the existence of explanations, i.e. there is no way to restrict the application
of E uniformly to a subset of worlds. Through this theorem, we can obviusly not apply Plaza’s method from [5]
to provide completeness over reduction.
3.1. A relativized knowing-why operator. To address this problem, we’re following the ideas of [9], where
the authors used the concept of relativization for similar problems concerning common knowledge, and of
[15], [16] from the context of non-classical epistemic logics, by relativizing the Ky operator, turning it into a
conditional version, namely Kyra(φ, ψ), with the following semantics:
(M, w) |= Kyra(φ, ψ) iff ∃t ∈ E : ∀v ∈W such that (w, v) ∈ Ra and (M, v) |= φ it is that
(1): v ∈ E(t, ψ) and (2): (M, v) |= ψ
This operator relates to “the agent a knows why ψ, under the condition φ“. Clearly, the original, unary, operator
Kyaφ corresponds to Ky
r
a(⊤, φ).
Two new versions of the logics presented before, namely ELKyr and following to this PAFKyr are directly
emerging from this, simply with
LELKyr : φ ::= p | ¬φ | (φ ∧ φ) | Kaφ | Ky
r
a(φ, φ)
with p ∈ P and a ∈ A and LPAFKyr being simply the augmentation of LELKyr with the notion of the [φ]
operator as shown before. The class of models associated with this new logic, named KyrS5 for the S5-
relational version, are structurally similar to the KyS5-models presented before, while Ky and its semantic
evaluation in |= are replaced with Kyr and the corresponding definition above.
Proposition 1. The following formulas are valid in the class of all S5-ELKyr-models.
(i) Kyra(φ, ψ → χ)→ (Ky
r
a(φ, ψ)→ Ky
r
a(φ, χ))
(ii) Kyra(φ, ψ)→ Ka(φ→ ψ)
(iii) Kyra(φ, ψ)→ KaKy
r
a(φ, ψ)
(iv) Kyra(ψ, χ) ∧Ka(φ→ ψ)→ Ky
r
a(φ, χ)
(v) Ka¬φ→ Kyra(φ, ψ)
Proof. In the following proofs, let M be an arbitrary model and w ∈ D(M) an arbitrary world.
(i) Suppose (M, w) |= Kyra(φ, ψ → χ) and (M, w) |= Ky
r
a(φ, ψ). By the rules of |=, the first one translates
to ∃t ∈ E : ∀v ∈ W : (w, v) ∈ Ra and (M, v) |= φ implies (M, v) |= ψ → χ and v ∈ E(t, ψ → χ). The
second one the translates to ∃s ∈ E : ∀v ∈ W : (w, v) ∈ Ra and (M, v) |= φ implies (M, v) |= ψ and
v ∈ E(s, ψ). By meet over W,Ra, E and φ, we have: ∃s, t ∈ E : ∀v ∈ W : (w, v) ∈ Ra and (M, w) |= φ
implies v ∈ E(t, ψ → χ), v ∈ E(s, ψ) and (M, v) |= ψ and (M, v) |= ψ → χ. From (MP), we have implied
that (M, v) |= χ. With this, and v ∈ E(t, ψ → χ) ∩ E(s, ψ) ⊆ E(s · t, χ), we have (M, w) |= Kyra(φ, χ).
(ii) Suppose (M, w) |= Kyra(φ, ψ). By this, we have ∃t ∈ E : ∀v ∈ W : (w, v) ∈ Ra and (M, v) |= φ implies
(M, v) |= ψ and v ∈ E(t, ψ). By cutting out E, we have ∀v ∈ W : (w, v) ∈ Ra and (M, v) |= φ implies
(M, v) |= ψ. This implies propositionally, that ∀v ∈ W : (w, v) ∈ Ra implies ((M, v) |= φ implies
(M, v) |= ψ), i.e. (M, w) |= Ka(φ→ ψ).
(iii) Suppose that (M, w) |= Kyra(φ, ψ). Now, we consider any v ∈ W with (w, v) ∈ Ra and u ∈ W with
(v, u) ∈ Ra. By the transitivity of the relations, we have (w, u) ∈ Ra implied. By (w, u) ∈ Ra for
every such u, we have ∃t ∈ E : ∀u ∈ W : (v, u) ∈ Ra and (M, u) |= φ implies (M, u) |= ψ and
u ∈ E(t, ψ), therefore (M, v) |= Kyra(φ, ψ) for every such v where (w, v) ∈ Ra, and thus we have
(M, w) |= KaKyra(φ, ψ).
(iv) Suppose that (M, w) |= Kyra(ψ, χ) and (M, w) |= Ka(φ → ψ), i.e. ∀v ∈ W : (w, v) ∈ Ra impl.
(M, v) |= φ → ψ. By the first, there exists a t ∈ E s.t. ∀v ∈ W : (w, v) ∈ Ra and (M, v) |= ψ impl.
(M, v) |= χ and v ∈ E(t, χ). Take this t, and any v ∈ W s.t. (w, v) ∈ Ra and (M, v) |= φ. Thus,
6 NICHOLAS PISCHKE
(M, v) |= ψ and thus v ∈ E(t, χ) and (M, v) |= χ. Thus (M, w) |= Kyra(φ, χ) by taking the meet over
W .
(v) Suppose that ∀v ∈ W : (w, v) ∈ Ra impl. (M, v) |= ¬φ, i.e. (M, v) 6|= φ. Thus, there is no world s.t.
(w, v) ∈ Ra and (M, v) |= φ, i.e. ∀v ∈ W : (w, v) ∈ Ra and (M, v) |= φ implies (M, v) |= ψ and thus
∃t ∈ E : ∀v ∈ W : (w, v) ∈ Ra and (M, v) |= φ implies (M, v) |= ψ and v ∈ E(t, ψ) as E is non-empty.
Thus (M, w) |= Kyra(φ, ψ).

We can even consider a stronger version of the distribution of the Kyr operator over→ in the right argument
by taking different premises into account.
Proposition 2. Kyra(χ, φ→ ψ) ∧Ky
r
a(θ, φ)→ Ky
r
a(χ ∧ θ, ψ) is valid in Ky
rS5.
Proof. Suppose (M, w) |= Kyra(χ, φ → ψ) and (M, w) |= Ky
r
a(θ, φ). The first one translates to ∃t ∈ E : ∀v ∈
W : (w, v) ∈ Ra and (M, v) |= χ implies (M, v) |= φ → ψ and v ∈ E(t, φ → ψ), while the second translates to
∃s ∈ E : ∀v ∈ W : (w, v) ∈ Ra and (M, v) |= θ implies (M, v) |= φ and v ∈ E(s, φ). By meet over W , Ra and
E, we have ∃t, s ∈ E : ∀v ∈ W : (w, v) ∈ Ra and (M, v) |= χ ∧ θ implies (M, v) |= φ → ψ and (M, v) |= φ
and v ∈ E(t, φ → ψ) ∩ E(s, φ). By the laws of modus ponens, we have (M, v) |= ψ for the latter and by the
properties of E , we have E(t, φ→ ψ) ∩ E(s, φ) ⊆ E(t · s, ψ), therefore (M, w) |= Kyra(χ ∧ θ, ψ). 
If two different premises χ and θ in the formulas Kyra(χ, φ→ ψ) and Ky
r
a(θ, φ) are actually contradictory to
each other, e.g. p and ¬p, the formula Kya(χ ∧ θ, ψ) automatically relates to the validity Kyra(⊥, φ).
The validity (i) from Prop. 1 is obviously semantically a special case of Prop. 2 with both χ and θ representing
the same formula.
3.2. An axiomatization of ELKyr. As an axiomatization for the logic ELKyr, we propose the here shown
Hilbert-calculus as an adaption of the system SKY from the initial paper to the new notion of the relativized
knowing-why operator. In correspondence to the before-mentioned paper, we call this system SKYR.
Definition 4 (The system SKYR). The proof system SKYR is defined as the following Hilbert-style calculus:
(PT ) : the classical propositional axioms
(K) : Ka(φ→ ψ)→ (Kaφ→ Kaψ)
(T ) : Kaφ→ φ
(4) : Kaφ→ KaKaφ
(5) : ¬Kaφ→ Ka¬Kaφ
(EKyR) : Kyra(χ, φ→ ψ)→ (Ky
r
a(θ, φ)→ Ky
r
a(χ ∧ θ, ψ))
(4Y KR) : Kyra(φ, ψ)→ KaKy
r
a(φ, ψ)
(DKyR) : Kyra(φ, ψ)→ Ka(φ→ ψ)
(IKyR) : Kyra(ψ, χ)→ (Ka(φ→ ψ)→ Ky
r
a(φ, χ))
(UKyR) : Ka¬φ→ Kyra(φ, ψ)
(MP ) : From φ and φ→ ψ, infer ψ
(NK) : From ⊢ φ, infer ⊢ Kaφ
(NKyR) : From φ ∈ Λ, infer ⊢ Kyra(⊤, φ)
The axiom (EKyR) provides, as mentioned before, a stronger version of the distribution of Kyr over → in
the right argument by using different premises in the left argument. The axiom (DKyR) defines the decompo-
sition or extraction of the fragment concerning the basic knowledge operator K from Kyr and axiom (4YKR)
provides the positive introspection of Kyr by the classical operator K. (IKyR) allows inference of knowing why
for stronger premises, provided the case for the weaker premise is already established and (UKyR) describes the
situation if the condition of the Kyr-operator is impossible from a current world, i.e. if every reachable world
does not satisfy the condition.
One may wonder about the axiom (5YKR), the negative introspection of Kyr by the operator K, which is
actually provable, exactly as its unconditioned companionen (5YK) was in the basic system SKY(s. Proposition
11, [17]).
Proposition 3. The following formulas are provable in SKYR:
(1) ¬Kyra(φ, ψ)→ Ka¬Ky
r
a(φ, ψ)
(2) Kyra(⊥, φ)
(3) Kyra(φ, ψ → χ)→ (Ky
r
a(φ, ψ)→ Ky
r
a(φ, χ))
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Proof. In the following, although (PT) references the usual propositional axioms, we let it denote any theorem
of the basic classical propositional calculus (over this new language).
(1) As a line derivation:
1 KaKy
r
a(φ, ψ)→ Ky
r
a(φ, ψ) Instance of (T)
2 ¬Kyra(φ, ψ)→ ¬KaKy
r
a(φ, ψ) Contraposition of 1
3 ¬KaKyra(φ, ψ)→ Ka¬KaKy
r
a(φ, ψ) Instance of (5)
4 Kyra(φ, ψ)→ KaKy
r
a(φ, ψ) Instance of (4YKR)
5 ¬KaKyra(φ, ψ)→ ¬Ky
r
a(φ, ψ) Contraposition of 4
6 Ka(¬KaKyra(φ, ψ)→ ¬Ky
r
a(φ, ψ)) (NK) on 5
7 Ka¬KaKyra(φ, ψ)→ Ka¬Ky
r
a(φ, ψ) (MP) with (K) on 6
8 ¬Kyra(φ, ψ)→ Ka¬KaKy
r
a(φ, ψ) (MP) on 2,3
9 ¬Kyra(φ, ψ)→ Ka¬Ky
r
a(φ, ψ) (MP) on 7,8
(2) As a line derivation:
1 ¬⊥ Instance of (PT)
2 Ka¬⊥ (NK) on 1
3 Ka¬⊥ → Kyra(⊥, φ) Instance of (UKyR)
4 Kyra(⊥, φ) (MP) on 2,3
(3) As a line derivation:
1 Kyra(φ, ψ → χ)→ (Ky
r
a(φ, ψ)→ Ky
r
a(φ ∧ φ, χ))
Instance of (EKyR)
2 Kyra(φ, ψ → χ) ∧Ky
r
a(φ, ψ)→ Ky
r
a(φ ∧ φ, χ)
(MP) and (PT) on 1
3 φ→ (φ ∧ φ) Instance of (PT)
4 Ka(φ→ (φ ∧ φ)) (NK) on 3
5 Kyra(φ ∧ φ, χ)→ (Ka(φ→ (φ ∧ φ))→ Ky
r
a(φ, χ))
Instance of (IKyR)
6 Ka(φ→ (φ ∧ φ))→ (Kyra(φ ∧ φ, χ)→ Ky
r
a(φ, χ))
(MP) and (PT) on 5
7 Kyra(φ ∧ φ, χ)→ Ky
r
a(φ, χ) (MP) on 4,6
8 Kyra(φ, ψ → χ) ∧Ky
r
a(φ, ψ)→ Ky
r
a(φ, χ) (MP) on 2,7
9 Kyra(φ, ψ → χ)→ (Ky
r
a(φ, ψ)→ Ky
r
a(φ, χ))
(MP) and (PT) on 8

From this point on, we can almost immediately consider the soundness of our system SKYR by finally
proposing the following.
Lemma 1. The rule (NKyR) is valid.
Proof. Let φ ∈ Λ and M be any model. Since Λ only contains tautologies, we have (M, w) |= φ f.a. w ∈ W .
By the first rule established for the behavior of E , we have that ∃e ∈ E : E(e, φ) =W . Thus, for every w ∈W ,
we have that (M, w) |= φ and w ∈ E(e, φ), i.e. we have ∃t ∈ E : ∀v ∈ W : (w, v) ∈ Ra and (M, v) |= ⊤ implies
(M, v) |= φ and v ∈ E(t, φ), i.e. (M, w) |= Kyra(⊤, φ) and this for any w ∈W . 
Lemma 2. The generalized necessitation rule for Kyra, i.e.
From φ ∈ Λ, infer ⊢ Kyra(ψ, φ)
is admissible for any ψ ∈ LELKyr .
Proof. Let φ ∈ Λ and ψ ∈ LELKyr . By (NKyR), we have ⊢ Kyra(⊤, φ). As an instance of a propositional
tautology, we have ⊢ ψ → ⊤ and by (NK), ⊢ Ka(ψ → ⊤). By (IKyR) and (MP), we have ⊢ Ky
r
a(ψ, φ). 
Theorem 2 (Soundness of SKYR over KyrS5). The system SKYR is sound with respect to the class of all
S5 − ELKyr-models.
Proof. This theorem is easily obtained by considering Lem. 1, Prop. 1 and Prop. 2 together with the fact, that
the ELKyr-models are based on the standard Kripkean-S5-models, making both the standard S5 axioms and
the rule (NK) valid. 
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3.2.1. Completeness. For the proof of completeness’ sake, we follow the common approach of considering a
canonical model being defined over all maximal consistent sets with the(later more explicitly defined) common
properties like truth in order to provide the framework for a somehow standard proof of a completeness theorem
in the context of modal logics. For this, we first consider:
Definition 5 (Consistency). A set Γ ⊆ LELKyr is called consistent (in SKYR), if Γ 6⊢SKYR ⊥. Otherwise, it is
called inconsistent, i.e. with Γ ⊢SKYR ⊥. Following to this, a set is called maximal consistent (over LELKyr) if
(1) it is consistent, i.e. Γ 6⊢SKYR ⊥,
(2) it is maximal, i.e. ∀Γ′ ⊆ LELKyr : Γ′ ⊃ Γ implies Γ′ ⊢ ⊥.
Proposition 4 (Properties of maximal consistent sets). Let Γ be maximal consistent. Then for all φ ∈ LELKyr
(i) Γ ⊢ φ iff φ ∈ Γ (deductive closure)
(ii) φ ∈ Γ iff ¬φ 6∈ Γ
(iii) φ, ψ ∈ Γ iff (φ ∧ ψ) ∈ Γ
(iv) ⊤ ∈ Γ
Proposition 5 (Lindenbaum). Every consistent set can be extended to a maximal consistent set.
The proof of both propositions is very canonical and thus omitted here. Following from these considerations,
we now define a canonical model with worlds corresponding to maximal consistent sets in the system SKYR.
Definition 6 (Canonical model for SKYR). The canonical model for SKYR is defined as the structure
M
c = 〈W c, Ec, {Rca | a ∈ A}, E
c, V c〉
with
• Eˆc : t ::= e | φ | (t · t) with φ ∈ LELKyr . We then set Ec = {e⊤} ∪ {tφ | t ∈ Eˆc \ {e}, φ ∈ LELKyr}.
· : Ec × Ec → Ec is given with (tφ · sψ) = (t · s)φ∧ψ.
5
• W c = {〈Γ, F, ~f〉}, such that Γ ⊆ LELKyr is maximal consistent, F ⊆ Ec×LELKyr , ~f = (fφa )a∈A,φ∈LELKyr ,
fφa : {ψ | Ky
r
a(φ, ψ) ∈ Γ} → E
c which fulfill the following conditions:
(1) (sα, φ→ ψ), (rβ , φ) ∈ F impl. ((sα · rβ), ψ) = ((s · r)α∧β , ψ) ∈ F
(2) If φ ∈ Λ, then (e⊤, φ) ∈ F .
(3) For any a ∈ A, if Kyra(φ, ψ) ∧ φ ∈ Γ, then (f
φ
a (ψ), ψ) ∈ F .
(4) For any a ∈ A, any φ ∈ LELKyr and any ψ ∈ dom(fφa ), f
φ
a (ψ) = tφ for some t ∈ Eˆ
c.6
• Rca = {(〈Γ, F, ~f〉, 〈∆, G,~g〉) ∈ W
c ×W c | Γ#a = {φ | Kaφ ∈ Γ} ⊆ ∆, ∀φ ∈ LELKyr : f
φ
a = g
φ
a}, for any
a ∈ A
• Ec(tφ, ψ) = {〈Γ, F, ~f〉 ∈W c | (tφ, ψ) ∈ F}, for tφ ∈ Ec
• V c(p) = {〈Γ, F, ~f〉 ∈W c | p ∈ Γ}, for p ∈ P
Note, that for the canonical model, e⊤ represents the required constant e from the original definition, indexed
by ⊤ here just to be in line with the notation. This definition is non-degenerate, as eφ for φ 6= ⊤ is non-existing
in Ec. The design choices have been made in coorperation to the basic ideas of [17] about the there presented
canonical model for SKY.
The main difference here is that we conditionalized the explanations, forcing them to keep track under which
conditional formulas they were enforced to be explanations for some formula. For further procedure, we first
need to show that the model itself is well defined according to the specifications shown in the preliminaries.
As it was observed in [17], a set of worlds with a 1-to-1 correspondence to maximal consistent sets is not
sufficient to provide the classical behavior of a canonical model in the context of the knowing-why notions, as
there is not a canonical way to attach explanation to formulas of a given maximal consistent set, i.e. setting
Ec at the respectively associated world, and thus it may be desirable to have the same maximal consistent set
accompanied by various versions of possible explanation scenarios. This stands in contrast to the completeness
proof of classical justification logic, where a simple 1-to-1 correspondence between maximal consistent sets and
worlds in the canonical model is possible. Mainly, in the newly shedded light from the logic of knowing why,
this result from justification logic directly encoding the used explanations into the syntax, thus in a way fixing
the desired state for pairs of explanations and formulas through the maximal consistent set of formulas directly.
Before proceeding to the proof of the well-definedness of Mc, we first adapt a helpful proposition from [17]
concerning the accessibility relations.
Proposition 6. Let Γ,∆ ⊆ LELKyr be max. consistent. If Γ#a ⊆ ∆, then
5Note, that we do not explicitly differentiate in notation between · as an operation on Ec and as a syntactical connective in Eˆc.
6Note, that here t = e is obviously only possible if φ = ⊤, as tφ = f
φ
a (ψ) ∈ E
c
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(i) Kaφ ∈ Γ iff Kaφ ∈ ∆ (ii) Ky
r
a(φ, ψ) ∈ Γ iff Ky
r
a(φ, ψ) ∈ ∆
Proof. Using properties for maximal consistent sets (Prop. 4), we infer:
(i) Let Kaφ ∈ Γ. By axiom (4)(and deductive closure of Γ
7), we have KaKaφ ∈ Γ, i.e. Kaφ ∈ ∆ per
definition of Γ#a ⊆ ∆. Let Kaφ 6∈ Γ, i.e. ¬Kaφ ∈ Γ and by axiom (5), we have Ka¬Kaφ ∈ Γ, i.e.
¬Kaφ ∈ ∆, i.e. Kaφ 6∈ ∆.
(ii) Let Kyra(φ, ψ) ∈ Γ, i.e. KaKy
r
a(φ, ψ) ∈ Γ by (4YKR), thus Ky
r
a(φ, ψ) ∈ ∆. Let Ky
r
a(φ, ψ) 6∈ Γ, i.e.
¬Kyra(φ, ψ) ∈ Γ, i.e. by (5YKR), we haveKa¬Ky
r
a(φ, ψ) ∈ Γ, i.e. ¬Ky
r
a(φ, ψ) ∈ ∆, i.e. Ky
r
a(φ, ψ) 6∈ ∆.

For the following, it is also interesting to note that by the above for two 〈Γ, F, ~f〉, 〈∆, G,~g〉 ∈W c, if Γ#a ⊆ ∆,
then dom(fφa ) = dom(g
φ
a ) for any φ ∈ LELKyr . We now propose:
Proposition 7. The canonical model Mc for SKYR is well defined, given the conditions for S5−ELKyr(S5−
ELKy)-models.
Proof. First, we check that Ec is well-defined. For this, note that Ec holds a designated explanation e⊤ whose
circumstances were explained before. Also, Ec is closed under the combination operation ·. To see this, let
x, y ∈ Ec, i.e. x = tφ, y = sψ for
• φ, ψ ∈ LELKyr and t, s ∈ Eˆc \ {e}, or
• t = e and thus φ = ⊤, or
• s = e and thus ψ = ⊤.
In any case, we have (x · y) = (tφ · sψ) = (t · s)φ∧ψ and in any case we have t, s ∈ Eˆc(as obviously also e ∈ Eˆc).
Thus, (t ·s) ∈ Eˆc and as never e = (t ·s), we have (t ·s) ∈ Eˆc \{e}. Thus (t ·s)φ∧ψ = (tφ ·sψ) ∈ Ec per definition.
Now we check the conditions on Ec and Rca for any a ∈ A:
Ec(e⊤, φ) =W c, φ ∈ Λ: Let φ ∈ Λ, thus by def. of Mc, we have (e⊤, φ) ∈ F for every 〈Γ, F, ~f 〉 ∈ W c, i.e.
〈Γ, F, ~f〉 ∈ Ec(e⊤, φ) f.a. 〈Γ, F, ~f 〉 ∈W c, i.e. Ec(e⊤, φ) =W c.
Ec(sα, φ→ ψ) ∩ Ec(rβ , φ) ⊆ Ec((s · r)α∧β , ψ): Let 〈Γ, F, ~f〉 ∈ Ec(sα, φ→ ψ)∩Ec(rβ , φ), i.e. (sα, φ→ ψ), (rβ , φ) ∈
F . Thus, per def., ((s · r)α∧β , ψ) ∈ F , i.e. 〈Γ, F, ~f〉 ∈ Ec((s · r)α∧β , ψ).
Rca is reflexive: Obviously, f
φ
a = f
φ
a f.a. φ ∈ LELKyr . Also, by (T), for every Kaφ ∈ Γ, we have φ ∈ Γ, i.e.
Γ#a ⊆ Γ.
Rca is symmetric: Supp. (〈Γ, F,
~f〉, 〈∆, G,~g〉) ∈ Rca, i.e. Γ
#
a ⊆ ∆ and f
φ
a = g
φ
a f.a. φ ∈ LELKyr . Automati-
cally, gφa = f
φ
a f.a. φ ∈ LELKyr . Also, let Kaφ ∈ ∆, then by Prop. 6, we have Kaφ ∈ Γ, i.e. by (T),
φ ∈ Γ, i.e. ∆#a ⊆ Γ. Thus (〈∆, G,~g〉, 〈Γ, F,
~f〉) ∈ Rca.
Rca is transitive: Let (〈Γ, F, ~f〉, 〈∆, G,~g〉) ∈ R
c
a and (〈∆, G,~g〉, 〈Θ, H,~h〉) ∈ R
c
a. Thus f
φ
a = g
φ
a f.a. φ ∈
LELKyr and gφa = h
φ
a f.a. φ ∈ LELKyr , i.e. f
φ
a = h
φ
a f.a. φ ∈ LELKyr . Also, let Kaφ ∈ Γ, i.e. by (4),
we have KaKaφ ∈ Γ, i.e. Kaφ ∈ ∆ by Γ#a ⊆ ∆ and thus φ ∈ Θ by ∆
#
a ⊆ Θ. Thus Γ
#
a ⊆ Θ. Therefore
(〈Γ, F, ~f 〉, 〈Θ, H,~h〉) ∈ Rca

In order to fully proof the functioning of the canonical model, we have left to show that W c is not empty.
Following [17], we provide a construction of some corresponding standard F and ~f for a given Γ, by that showing
that there exists at least one world 〈Γ, F, ~f〉 for every maximal consistent set Γ in the language of LELKyr and
the calculus SKYR.
Definition 7. Given any maximal consistent set Γ, construct corresponding standard world parts FΓ and ~fΓ
as follows:
(1) FΓ0 = {(e⊤, φ) | φ ∈ Λ} ∪ {(ψφ, ψ) | ∃b ∈ A : Ky
r
b (φ, ψ) ∧ φ ∈ Γ}.
(2) FΓn+1 = F
Γ
n ∪ {((s · r)α∧β , ψ) | (sα, φ→ ψ), (rβ , φ) ∈ F
Γ
n }, f.a. n ≥ 0
(3) FΓ =
⋃
n∈N F
Γ
n
(4) fφb (ψ) = ψφ f.a. b ∈ A and all φ ∈ LELKyr , ψ ∈ dom(f
φ
b )
From this construction, we can now consider the following proposition providing the non-emptiness of W c.
Proposition 8. For any maximal consistent set Γ, 〈Γ, FΓ, ~fΓ〉 ∈W c.
Proof. It is already supposed that Γ is maximal consistent. We show the properties (1) - (4) of W c:
7This phrase will be omitted in the following.
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(1) Suppose (sα, φ → ψ), (rβ , φ) ∈ F
Γ, i.e. ∃k ∈ N : (sα, φ → ψ), (rβ , φ) ∈ F
Γ
k . Then by const., we have
((s · r)α∧β , ψ) ∈ FΓk+1 ⊆ F
Γ.
(2) Let φ ∈ Λ, then (e⊤, φ) ∈ FΓ0 ⊆ F
Γ.
(3) Let a ∈ A and let Kyra(φ, ψ) ∧ φ ∈ Γ. Then f
φ
a (ψ) = ψφ and (ψφ, ψ) ∈ F
Γ
0 , i.e. (f
φ
a (ψ), ψ) ∈ F
Γ.
(4) Obviously, fφa (ψ) = ψφ = tφ f.s. t ∈ Eˆ
c.
Note that fφa is well defined for every φ ∈ LELKyr and every a ∈ A (that is f
φ
a (ψ) ∈ E
c for every ψ ∈ dom(fφa ))
as ψ ∈ Eˆc \ {e} and thus ψφ ∈ Ec, for any φ ∈ LELKyr . 
In the following, we will now reestablish the existence lemmas for both K and Kyr following the ideas of [17]
in order provide the last necessary steps before considering the truth lemma. The key of both existence lemmas
is to provide constructions of worlds related by an accessibility relation which refute either the formula itself or
any possible explanation in some way, provided that the corresponding K or Kyr formula is not member of the
to-speak set.
Lemma 3. For any 〈Γ, F, ~f〉 ∈ W c and any max. cons. ∆ s.t. Γ#a ⊆ ∆, there exists a 〈∆, G,~g〉 ∈ W
c with
(〈Γ, F, ~f 〉, 〈∆, G,~g〉) ∈ Rca.
Proof. Let a ∈ A be fixed and Γ#a ⊆ ∆. Note first, that thus dom(f
φ
a ) = dom(g
φ
a ) for any φ ∈ LELKyr . We
define the world 〈∆, G,~g〉 as the following:
(1) gφb (ψ) =
{
f
φ
b (ψ), if b = a
ψφ, otherwise
, for any b ∈ A, φ ∈ LELKyr and ψ ∈ dom(g
φ
b )
(2) G0 = F ∪ {(g
φ
b (ψ), ψ) | Ky
r
b (φ, ψ) ∧ φ ∈ ∆}
(3) Gn+1 = Gn ∪ {((s · r)α∧β , ψ) | (sα, φ→ ψ), (rβ , φ) ∈ Gn} f.a. n ≥ 0
(4) G =
⋃
n∈NGn
It is still left to show that the by that constructed world follows the conditions of the canonical model.
Claim: 〈∆, G,~g〉 ∈ W c
Proof: By supposition, ∆ is maximal consistent. We check the properties (1) - (4) of W c:
(1) Suppose (sα, φ → ψ), (rβ , φ) ∈ G, i.e. ∃k ∈ N : (sα, φ → ψ), (rβ , φ) ∈ Gk. Then by const., we have
((s · r)α∧β , ψ) ∈ Gk+1 ⊆ G.
(2) Let φ ∈ Λ, then (e⊤, φ) ∈ F ⊆ G0 ⊆ G.
(3) Let Kyrb (φ, ψ) ∧ φ ∈ ∆ for some b ∈ A. Then by def. (g
φ
b (ψ), ψ) ∈ G0 ⊆ G.
(4) Let b ∈ A. Obviously, gφb (ψ) = ψφ = tφ f.s. t ∈ Eˆ
c \ {e} if b 6= a. For b = a, as fφa is well-defined, we
have gφa (ψ) = f
φ
a (ψ) = tφ f.s. appropriate t ∈ Eˆ
c.

We have Γ#a ⊆ ∆ and by construction f
φ
a = g
φ
a f.a. φ ∈ LELKyr , thus (〈Γ, F, ~f 〉, 〈∆, G,~g〉) ∈ R
c
a. 
Lemma 4 (Ka existence lemma). For any 〈Γ, F, ~f〉 ∈ W c, if Kaφ1 6∈ Γ, there exists a 〈∆, G,~g〉 ∈ W c with
(〈Γ, F, ~f 〉, 〈∆, G,~g〉) ∈ Rca and ¬φ1 ∈ ∆.
Proof. Suppose Kaφ1 6∈ Γ, i.e. ¬Kaφ1 ∈ Γ for some fixed a ∈ A. For the desired properties, consider
∆− = {¬φ1} ∪ {φ | Kaφ ∈ Γ}
To later extend this set to a full maximal consistent one, we establish the following:
Claim: ∆− is consistent.
Proof: Proof by contradiction, i.e. suppose that ∆− is inconsistent. Then there exists some finite subset
Θ = {ψ1, . . . , ψn} ⊆ Γ#a such that
⊢SKYR
n∧
i=1
ψi → φ1
By (NK) as well as distribution of Ka over ∧ and via the axiom (K), we have
⊢SKYR
n∧
i=1
Kaψi → Kaφ1
As ψi ∈ Γ#a f.a. i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, we have Kaψi ∈ Γ f.a. such i, i.e.
∧n
i=1Kaψi ∈ Γ. We have, by deductive
closure, that Kaφ1 ∈ Γ. Contradiction. 
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Let ∆ be the extension of ∆− to a max. consistent set(Prop. 5). Then, by Lem. 3, there exists a world
〈∆, G,~g〉 ∈W c s.t. (〈Γ, F, ~f〉, 〈∆, G,~g〉) ∈ Rca with φ1 6∈ ∆ by construction. 
Definition 8. Let t ∈ Eˆc. s ∈ Eˆc is a proper subterm of t, denoted by t ≻ s, if t 6= s but s occurs somewhere
inside t.
Note, that thus s 6≻ s. Note also that ≻ is obviously transitive, i.e. that t ≻ s, s ≻ r implies t ≻ r.
Lemma 5. Let 〈Γ, F, ~f〉 ∈ W c and Kyra(φ1, φ2) 6∈ Γ. For any φ3 ∈ Γ and for any (sφ1 , φ2) ∈ F , there exists a
world 〈∆, G,~g〉 ∈W c s.t. φ3 ∈ ∆, (〈Γ, F, ~f〉, 〈∆, G,~g〉) ∈ Rca and (sφ1 , φ2) 6∈ G.
Proof. Let a ∈ A be fixed and 〈Γ, F, ~f 〉 ∈W c be as supposed, φ3 ∈ Γ and (sφ1 , φ2) ∈ F . We construct 〈∆, G,~g〉
as follows:
(1) ∆ = Γ
(2) Take Ψ = {(tφ, ψ) ∈ F | Kyra(φ, ψ) 6∈ Γ} and Ψ
′ = {((t · s)φ, ψ) | (tφ, ψ) ∈ Ψ}
(3) G0 = (F \Ψ) ∪Ψ′
(4) Gn+1 = Gn ∪ {((t · r)α∧β , ψ) | (tα, φ→ ψ), (rβ , φ) ∈ Gn} for all n ≥ 0
(5) G =
⋃
n∈NGn
(6) gφb (ψ) =
{
f
φ
b (ψ), if (f
φ
b (ψ), ψ) 6∈ Ψ
(t · s)φ, if (f
φ
b (ψ), ψ) ∈ Ψ and where tφ = f
φ
b (ψ)
Claim: 〈∆, G,~g〉 ∈ W c
Proof: We check the conditions on W c:
(1) This follows again by the chain construction of G and the built in closure conditions.
(2) Let φ ∈ Λ, i.e. Kyra(⊤, φ) ∈ Γ by (NKyR) and (e⊤, φ) ∈ F as 〈Γ, F,
~f 〉 is well-defined, i.e. (e⊤, φ) ∈
F \Ψ ⊆ G0 ⊆ G.
(3) Let Kyrb (φ, ψ) ∧ φ ∈ Γ for some b ∈ A. Thus (f
φ
b (ψ), ψ) ∈ F . If Ky
r
a(φ, ψ) ∈ Γ, then (f
φ
b (ψ), ψ) 6∈ Ψ
and thus gφb (ψ) = f
φ
b (ψ) and (g
φ
b (ψ), ψ) = (f
φ
b (ψ), ψ) = (tφ, ψ) ∈ F \ Ψ ⊆ G0 ⊆ G. If Ky
r
a(φ, ψ) 6∈ Γ,
then (fφb (ψ), ψ) ∈ Ψ and thus (g
φ
b (ψ), ψ) = ((t · s)φ, ψ) for f
φ
b (ψ) = tφ as well as (g
φ
b (ψ), ψ) ∈ Ψ
′ since
(fφb (ψ), ψ) ∈ Ψ, i.e. (g
φ
b (ψ), ψ) ∈ Ψ
′ ⊆ G0 ⊆ G.
(4) As fφb is well-defined, g
φ
b is well-defined as well.

Note, that if Kyra(φ, ψ) 6∈ Γ, but (tφ, ψ) ∈ G0, then t ≻ s, as suppose (tφ, ψ) ∈ G0, then either (tφ, ψ) ∈ F \Ψ or
(tφ, ψ) ∈ Ψ′. For the former, (tφ, ψ) ∈ F and Kyra(φ, ψ) ∈ Γ. Contradiction. For the latter, t ≻ s per definition.
Claim: (〈Γ, F, ~f〉, 〈∆, G,~g〉) ∈ Rca
Proof: As ∆ = Γ, obviously Γ#a ⊆ ∆. Also dom(g
φ
a ) = dom(f
φ
a ) for any φ ∈ LELKyr as Γ = ∆. Now, take any
fφa and ψ ∈ dom(f
φ
a ). As ψ ∈ dom(f
φ
a ), it is that Ky
r
a(φ, ψ) ∈ Γ. If (f
φ
a (ψ), ψ) 6∈ F (as maybe φ 6∈ Γ), then
(fφa (ψ), ψ) 6∈ Ψ, as Ψ ⊆ F . Otherwise, still (f
φ
a (ψ), ψ) 6∈ Ψ by Ky
r
a(φ, ψ) ∈ Γ, i.e. either way g
φ
a (ψ) = f
φ
a (ψ). 
Claim: If Kyra(φ, ψ) 6∈ Γ and (tφ, ψ) ∈ Gn+1 \Gn, then t ≻ s.
Proof: Let Kyra(φ, ψ) 6∈ Γ. Induction on n:
(IB): Let n = 0. Take (tφ, ψ) ∈ G1 \ G0, i.e. ∃(t
′
φ′ , χ → ψ), (t
′′
φ′′ , χ) ∈ G0 s.t. tφ = (t
′
φ′ · t
′′
φ′′), i.e. t = (t
′ · t′′)
and φ = φ′ ∧ φ′′. We distinguish three cases:
(i) (t′φ′ , χ→ ψ) ∈ Ψ
′: Then t′ ≻ s per def., i.e. t ≻ s.
(ii) (t′′φ′′ , χ) ∈ Ψ
′: Then t′′ ≻ s by def., i.e. t ≻ s.
(iii) (t′φ′ , χ→ ψ), (t
′′
φ′′ , χ) 6∈ Ψ
′: Thus (t′φ′ , χ→ ψ), (t
′′
φ′′ , χ) ∈ F \Ψ and thereforeKy
r
a(φ
′, χ→ ψ) ∈ Γ and
Kyra(φ
′′, χ) ∈ Γ. Thus by (EKyR), we have Kyra(φ
′ ∧φ′′, ψ) ∈ Γ, i.e. Kyra(φ, ψ) ∈ Γ. Contradiction.
(IS) : Let n > 0. Take (tφ, ψ) ∈ Gn+1 \ Gn. Thus ∃(t′φ′ , χ → ψ), (t
′′
φ′′ , χ) ∈ Gn s.t. t = (t
′ · t′′) and
φ = φ′ ∧ φ′′. We also have Kyra(φ
′, χ → ψ) 6∈ Γ or Kyra(φ
′′, χ) 6∈ Γ as otherwise as above we have
Kyra(φ
′ ∧ φ′′, ψ) = Kyra(φ, ψ) ∈ Γ by (EKyR). Also (t
′
φ′ , χ→ ψ) 6∈ Gn−1 or (t
′′
φ′′ , χ) 6∈ Gn−1 as otherwise
(tφ, ψ) ∈ Gn. We distinguish the following cases:
(i) Kyra(φ
′, χ→ ψ) 6∈ Γ, (t′φ′ , χ→ ψ) ∈ Gn \Gn−1: By (IH), we have that t
′ ≻ s, i.e. t ≻ s.
(ii) Kyra(φ
′, χ→ ψ) 6∈ Γ, (t′φ′ , χ→ ψ) ∈ Gn−1: We again divide in two cases:
(a) (t′φ′ , χ→ ψ) ∈ G0: By the above remark, we have (t
′
φ′ , χ→ ψ) ∈ G0 but Ky
r
a(φ
′, χ→ ψ) 6∈ Γ,
i.e. t′ ≻ s and thus t ≻ s.
(b) (t′φ′ , χ → ψ) ∈ Gk+1 \ Gk for some 0 ≤ k ≤ n − 2: We again apply (IH), and derive t
′ ≻ s,
i.e. t ≻ s.
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(iii) Kyra(φ
′′, χ) 6∈ Γ, (t′′φ′′ , χ) ∈ Gn \Gn−1: By (IH), we have t
′′ ≻ s and thus t ≻ s.
(iv) Kyra(φ
′′, χ) 6∈ Γ, (t′′φ′′ , χ) ∈ Gn−1: As above, we divide in two similar cases:
(a) (t′′φ′′ , χ) ∈ G0: By the one remark above, we have (t
′′
φ′′ , χ) ∈ G0 but Ky
r
a(φ
′′, χ) 6∈ Γ, i.e.
t′′ ≻ s and thus t ≻ s.
(b) (t′′φ′′ , χ) ∈ Gk+1 \ Gk for some 0 ≤ k ≤ n − 2: We again apply (IH), and derive t
′′ ≻ s, i.e.
t ≻ s.

Claim: (sφ1 , φ2) 6∈ G.
Proof: We have (sφ1 , φ2) ∈ F but Ky
r
a(φ1, φ2) 6∈ Γ. Suppose that (sφ1 , φ2) ∈ G, i.e. either (sφ1 , φ2) ∈ G0, or
∃k ∈ N, s.t. (sφ1 , φ2) ∈ Gk+1 \Gk. For the former, we have that s ≻ s. Contradiction. For the latter, by the
previous claim, we have s ≻ s. Contradiction. Thus (sφ1 , φ2) 6∈ G. 
Note, that φ3 ∈ ∆ as ∆ = Γ. 
Lemma 6. Let 〈Γ, F, ~f〉 ∈ W c and Kyra(φ1, φ2) ∈ Γ but φ1 6∈ Γ. For each φ3 ∈ Γ and for any (sφ1 , φ2) ∈ F ,
there exists a world 〈∆, G,~g〉 ∈ W c s.t. φ3 ∈ ∆, (〈Γ, F, ~f 〉, 〈∆, G,~g〉) ∈ Rca and (sφ1 , φ2) 6∈ G.
Proof. Let a ∈ A be fixed and 〈Γ, F, ~f〉 ∈W c with Kyra(φ1, φ2) ∈ Γ but φ1 6∈ Γ. Take φ3 ∈ Γ and (sφ1 , φ2) ∈ F .
We again construct 〈∆, G,~g〉 as follows:
(1) ∆ = Γ
(2) Take Ψ = {(tφ, ψ) ∈ F | φ 6∈ Γ} and Ψ′ = {((t · s)φ, ψ) | (tφ, ψ) ∈ Ψ}
(3) G0 = (F \Ψ) ∪Ψ′
(4) Gn+1 = Gn ∪ {((t · r)α∧β , ψ) | (tα, φ→ ψ), (rβ , φ) ∈ Gn} for all n ≥ 0
(5) G =
⋃
n∈NGn
(6) gφb (ψ) = f
φ
b (ψ) for all b ∈ A, φ ∈ LELKyr and ψ ∈ dom(g
φ
b )
Claim: 〈∆, G,~g〉 ∈ W c
Proof: We check the conditions of W c:
(1) This follows directly by the chain construction of G.
(2) Let φ ∈ Λ, i.e. (e⊤, φ) ∈ F , and as ⊤ ∈ Γ (Prop. 4), we have (e⊤, φ) 6∈ Ψ, i.e. (e⊤, φ) ∈ G0 ⊆ G.
(3) Let Kyrb (φ, ψ) ∧ φ ∈ Γ for some b ∈ A. Thus (f
φ
b (ψ), ψ) ∈ F and as φ ∈ Γ (Prop. 4) and f
φ
b (ψ) = tφ,
we have (fφb (ψ), ψ) 6∈ Ψ, i.e. as g
φ
b (ψ) = f
φ
b (ψ), we have (f
φ
b (ψ), ψ) = (g
φ
b (ψ), ψ) ∈ G0 ⊆ G.
(4) As ~f is well-defined, ~g is well-defined as well.

Note, in analogy to the proof of Lemma 5, that if φ 6∈ Γ but (tφ, ψ) ∈ G0, then t ≻ s.
Claim: (〈Γ, F, ~f〉, 〈∆, G,~g〉) ∈ Rca
Proof: As ∆ = Γ, we have Γ#a ⊆ ∆ and per definition, we have g
φ
a (ψ) = f
φ
a (ψ). 
Claim: If φ 6∈ Γ and (tφ, ψ) ∈ Gn+1 \Gn, then t ≻ s.
Proof: Let φ 6∈ Γ. Induction on n:
(IB): Let n = 0. Let (tφ, ψ) ∈ G1 \G0, i.e. ∃(t′φ′ , χ → ψ), (t
′′
φ′′ , χ) ∈ G0 s.t. t = (t
′ · t′′) and φ = φ′ ∧ φ′′. We
again divide in three cases:
(i) (t′φ′ , χ→ ψ) ∈ Ψ
′: By def., t′ ≻ s, i.e. t ≻ s.
(ii) (t′′φ′′ , χ) ∈ Ψ
′: Again by def. of Ψ′, t′′ ≻ s, i.e. t ≻ s.
(iii) (t′φ′ , χ→ ψ), (t
′′
φ′′ , χ) 6∈ Ψ
′: As (t′φ′ , χ→ ψ) 6∈ Ψ
′ we have (t′φ′ , χ→ ψ) ∈ F \Ψ, i.e. (t
′
φ′ , χ→ ψ) ∈ F
and (t′φ′ , χ → ψ) 6∈ Ψ, thus φ
′ ∈ Γ and similarly, as (t′′φ′′ , χ) 6∈ Ψ
′, we have φ′′ ∈ Γ. Thus
φ = φ′ ∧ φ′′ ∈ Γ by Prop. 4. Contradiction.
(IS) : Let n > 0 and (tφ, ψ) ∈ Gn+1 \ Gn, i.e. ∃(t′φ′ , χ → ψ), (t
′′
φ′′ , χ) ∈ Gn s.t. t = (t
′ · t′′) and φ = φ′ ∧ φ′′.
Note that not both (t′φ′ , χ → ψ), (t
′′
φ′′ , χ) ∈ Gn−1, as otherwise (tφ, ψ) ∈ Gn. Also not both φ
′, φ′′ ∈ Γ,
as otherwise φ′ ∧ φ′′ = φ ∈ Γ as before by Prop. 4. We divide between four cases:
(i) φ′ 6∈ Γ, (t′φ′ , χ→ ψ) ∈ Gn \Gn−1: By (IH), we have t
′ ≻ s, i.e. t ≻ s.
(ii) φ′ 6∈ Γ, (t′φ′ , χ→ ψ) ∈ Gn−1: We divide between the following cases:
(a) (t′φ′ , χ→ ψ) ∈ G0: Thus by the above remark, we have t
′ ≻ s.
(b) (t′φ′ , χ→ ψ) ∈ Gk+1 \Gk for some 0 ≤ k ≤ n− 2: By (IH), we derive t
′ ≻ s, i.e. t ≻ s.
(iii) φ′′ 6∈ Γ, (t′′φ′′ , χ) ∈ Gn \Gn−1: By (IH), we have t
′′ ≻ s, i.e. t ≻ s.
(iv) φ′′ 6∈ Γ, (t′′φ′′ , χ) ∈ Gn−1: We lastly divide between the following cases:
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(a) (t′′φ′′ , χ) ∈ G0: Again, by the base case, we have t
′′ ≻ s.
(b) (t′′φ′′ , χ) ∈ Gk+1 \Gk for some 0 ≤ k ≤ n− 2: By (IH), we derive t
′′ ≻ s, i.e. t ≻ s.

Claim: (sφ1 , φ2) 6∈ G.
Proof: By supposition (sφ1 , φ2) ∈ F , but φ1 6∈ Γ. Suppose for contradiction, that (sφ1 , φ2) ∈ G, i.e. (sφ1 , φ2) ∈
G0 or (sφ1 , φ2) ∈ Gk+1 \Gk for some k ∈ N. For the former, we’d have s ≻ s. Contradiction. For the latter, by
the previously established claim, we have also s ≻ s. Contradiction. Thus (sφ1 , φ2) 6∈ G. 
Again, we have that φ3 ∈ ∆ as ∆ = Γ. 
Lemma 7 (Kyra existence lemma). Let 〈Γ, F, ~f〉 ∈ W
c and Kyra(φ1, φ2) 6∈ Γ. For any sφ3 ∈ E
c, there exists a
world 〈∆, G,~g〉 ∈W c s.t. (〈Γ, F, ~f 〉, 〈∆, G,~g〉) ∈ Rca, φ1 ∈ ∆ and (sφ3 , φ2) 6∈ G.
Proof. Let a ∈ A be fixed and 〈Γ, F, ~f〉 ∈ W c s.t. Kyra(φ1, φ2) 6∈ Γ. Take sφ3 ∈ E
c. We divide between two
cases: (i): Kyra(φ3, φ2) 6∈ Γ and (ii): Ky
r
a(φ3, φ2) ∈ Γ.
(i) Let Kyra(φ3, φ2) 6∈ Γ. Suppose that φ1 ∈ Γ. If (sφ3 , φ2) 6∈ F , there is nothing to do, as 〈Γ, F,
~f〉 can
reach itself. If (sφ3 , φ2) ∈ F , then by Lem. 5, we get the desired world.
Suppose that φ1 6∈ Γ. Then Γ#a ∪{φ1} is still consistent, as supp. otherwise, then for some ψ1, . . . , ψn ∈
Γ#a :
⊢SKYR
n∧
i=1
ψi → ¬φ1
i.e. by (NK), distribution over ∧ and axiom (K), we have
⊢SKYR
n∧
i=1
Kaψi → Ka¬φ1
Thus Ka¬φ1 ∈ Γ and by (UKyR), we’d have Ky
r
a(φ1, φ2) ∈ Γ. Contradiction.
Thus, we extend this set Γ#a ∪ {φ1} to a maximal consistent one, say ∆. Now, there is a world
〈∆, G,~g〉 ∈W c with (〈Γ, F, ~f〉, 〈∆, G,~g〉) ∈ Rca and φ1 ∈ ∆ by Lem. 3.
Also, as of Prop. 6, we have Kyra(φ1, φ2) 6∈ ∆ and Ky
r
a(φ3, φ2) 6∈ ∆. Again, if (sφ3 , φ2) 6∈ G,
then there is nothing to do anymore. If (sφ3 , φ2) ∈ G, then by Lem. 5, we find a world 〈Θ, H,~h〉
s.t. (〈∆, G,~g〉, 〈Θ, H,~h〉) ∈ Rca, i.e. (〈Γ, F,
~f〉, 〈Θ, H,~h〉) ∈ Rca by transitivity, and with φ1 ∈ Θ and
(sφ3 , φ2) 6∈ H .
(ii) Let Kyra(φ3, φ2) ∈ Γ. Thus ¬Ka(φ1 → φ3) ∈ Γ, as otherwise Ky
r
a(φ1, φ2) ∈ Γ by (IKyR). Thus,
by Lem. 4, there is a world 〈∆, G,~g〉 ∈ W c s.t. (〈Γ, F, ~f〉, 〈∆, G,~g〉) ∈ Rca and ¬(φ1 → φ3) ∈ ∆, i.e.
φ1∧¬φ3 ∈ ∆ and thus φ1 ∈ ∆ and ¬φ3 ∈ ∆. Obviously, again by Prop. 6, we still haveKyra(φ1, φ2) 6∈ ∆
and Kyra(φ3, φ2) ∈ ∆. If (sφ3 , φ2) 6∈ G, then we’re done. Otherwise, by Lem. 6, there exists a world
〈Θ, H,~h〉 ∈ W c s.t. (〈∆, G,~g〉, 〈Θ, H,~h〉) ∈ Rca, and thus (〈Γ, F,
~f〉, 〈Θ, H,~h〉) ∈ Rca again by transitivity,
where we have φ1 ∈ Θ and (sφ3 , φ2) 6∈ H .

Following from these considerations, we now propose the truth lemma corresponding to our canonical model
M
c.
Lemma 8 (Truth). (Mc, 〈Γ, F, ~f 〉) |= φ if and only if φ ∈ Γ for all φ ∈ LELKyr and all 〈Γ, F, ~f〉 ∈ W c.
Proof. The proof is established by induction over the structure of the formula φ.
For the induction base, we consider
(IB): φ = p: By the definition of V c, p ∈ Γ iff 〈Γ, F, ~f 〉 ∈ V c(p) iff (Mc, 〈Γ, F, ~f 〉) |= p.
For the induction step we now distinguish the following cases for the different structures of the formula φ:
(IS): (i): φ = ¬ψ, (ii): φ = ψ ∧ χ, (iii): φ = Kaψ and (iv): φ = Kyra(ψ, χ). As the first three cases are
in some sense standard(s. for example Lemma 7.5, [10]), we will just focus on item (iv). In the following, let
wΓ, w∆, wΘ be shorthands for some structures 〈Γ, F, ~f〉, 〈∆, G,~g〉, 〈Θ, H,~h〉 ∈ W c.
First, suppose that Kyra(ψ, χ) ∈ Γ. Let tψ := f
ψ
a (χ) ∈ E
c. Consider an arbitrary world w∆ with (wΓ, w∆) ∈ R
c
a
and additionally (Mc, w∆) |= ψ. By (IH), we have ψ ∈ ∆ from the latter. As thus Kyra(ψ, χ)∧ψ ∈ ∆ by Prop.
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4, we have (gψa (χ), χ) ∈ G, i.e. w∆ ∈ E
c(gψa (χ), χ). As (wΓ, w∆) ∈ R
c
a, we have that f
ψ
a (χ) = g
ψ
a (χ) = tψ, i.e.
w∆ ∈ Ec(tψ, χ). We also have, as Kyra(ψ, χ) ∈ ∆, that Ka(ψ → χ) ∈ ∆ by (DKyR) and thus that ψ → χ ∈ ∆
by (T). As ψ ∈ ∆, we have χ ∈ ∆ by (MP). By (IH), we have (Mc, w∆) |= χ. Putting everything together, we
have (Mc, wΓ) |= Kyra(ψ, χ).
On the other hand, suppose that Kyra(ψ, χ) 6∈ Γ, therefore ¬Ky
r
a(ψ, χ) ∈ Γ. We consider either (i): Ka(ψ →
χ) ∈ Γ or (ii): Ka(ψ → χ) 6∈ Γ.
For (i), by Lem. 7, we have that for any sψ′ ∈ E
c, there exists a world 〈∆, G,~g〉 ∈W c s.t. (〈Γ, F, ~f 〉, 〈∆, G,~g〉) ∈
Rca, ψ ∈ ∆ (by (IH), (M
c, w∆) |= ψ) and (sψ′ , χ) 6∈ G. Thus there is no single sψ′ ∈ Ec such that for all reach-
able worlds w∆ with ψ ∈ ∆ we have (sψ′ , χ) ∈ G, i.e. there is no single sψ′ ∈ Ec s.t. for all reachable worlds w∆
with (Mc, w∆) |= ψ, we have that w∆ ∈ Ec(sψ′ , χ). By the semantics of Kyra, we have (M
c, wΓ) 6|= Kyra(ψ, χ).
For (ii), i.e. ¬Ka(ψ → χ) ∈ Γ, by Lem. 4, we have a world w∆ with (wΓ, w∆) ∈ Rca such that ¬(ψ → χ) ∈ ∆.
Therefore ψ∧¬χ ∈ ∆ and by (IH), we have (Mc, w∆) |= ψ and (Mc, w∆) 6|= χ. Thus (Mc, wΓ) 6|= Kyra(ψ, χ). 
Theorem 3 (Completeness of SKYR over KyrS5). Γ |=KyrS5 φ implies Γ ⊢SKYR φ.
Proof. Suppose Γ 6⊢SKYR φ, then Γ ∪ {¬φ} is obviously consistent. Now, let Γ′ be the extensions of Γ∪ {¬φ} to
a maximal consistent set. By the definition of the canonical model and Prop. 8, there exists at least one world
for this set in W c, namely 〈Γ′, FΓ
′
, ~fΓ
′
〉. By Lem. 8, we have (Mc, 〈Γ′, FΓ
′
, ~fΓ
′
〉) |= Γ∪{¬φ} as Γ∪{¬φ} ⊆ Γ′,
and thus Γ ∪ {¬φ} is satisfiable. Therefore, we have Γ 6|=KyrS5 φ. 
4. Expressivity comparisons
As it was said at the beginning of the paper, the initial motivation was to study the dynamic extensions
for the logic of knowing-why, with a first look at public announcements. As the logic ELKyr was presented
as some sort of workaround for problems concerning the logic PAFKy(or more precise, concerning the classic
style of axiomatization for ”public announcement”-type logics), we now make expressivity comparisons between
the newly introduced logics of this paper.
Before proceeding, it may additionally be notable that we find that Kyra(φ, ψ), although sugested in the final
section of [17], does not directly correspond to [φ]Kyaψ. For this, one may easily imagine the following model
M:
q
s : p
w1
p, q
t : p
w2
p, q
r : p
w3
a
a
a
a a
a
Since (M, w1) 6|= p, we have that (M, w1) |= [p]Kyaq from the semantics of [·]. At the same time, we find that
(M, w1) 6|= Kyra(p, q) as, although w1 is not considered in the evaluation of the E-clause because of the before
mentioned condition, we still find that there does not exists a uniform t ∈ E for the left-to-consider worlds w2
and w3.
The main difference exploited here is the missing φ-implication in the semantical definition of Kyra(φ, ψ). In
the following argument though, it can also be seen that even a corresponding modification has no possibility in
providing an adequate translation. For this, we introduce a second concept from the original paper [17].
Definition 9 (Factivity Property). A model M has the factivity property(is factive), if whenever w ∈ E(t, φ),
then (M, w) |= φ.
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Given a model M = 〈W,E, {Ra | a ∈ A}, E , V 〉, one may construct its factive companion M
F = 〈W,E, {Ra |
a ∈ A}, EF , V 〉 where
EF (t, φ) = E(t, φ) \ {w ∈ W | (M, w) 6|= φ}
Obviously, for a factive model M, M and MF coincide. The following lemma now asserts that the ELKy-
formulas are neutral in respect to facitvity.
Lemma 9 (Xu, Wang, Studer [17]). For any φ ∈ LELKy, any ELKy-model M and any w ∈ D(M), (M, w) |= φ
if and only if (MF , w) |= φ.
We obtain the following generalization for ELKyr.
Lemma 10. For any φ ∈ LELKyr , any ELKyr-model M and any w ∈ D(M), (M, w) |= φ if and only if
(MF , w) |= φ.
Proof. Proof by induction on the structure of formulas. We leave the classical propositional and modal cases
unconsidered, as M is only possibly different from MF in the explanation function. Thus consider Kyra(φ, ψ):
Suppose (M, w) |= Kyra(φ, ψ), i.e. ∃t ∈ E : ∀v ∈ W : (w, v) ∈ Ra and (M, v) |= φ implies (M, v) |= ψ and
v ∈ E(t, ψ). Thus, for all those v, v 6∈ {u | (M, u) 6|= ψ}, i.e. v ∈ EF (t, ψ) as (M, v) |= ψ. By (IH), we have
(MF , w) |= Kyra(φ, ψ).
Suppose otherwise that (MF , w) |= Kyra(φ, ψ), i.e. ∃t ∈ E : ∀v ∈ W : (w, v) ∈ Ra and (M
F , v) |= φ implies
(MF , v) |= ψ and v ∈ EF (t, ψ). By v ∈ EF (t, ψ), we automatically have v ∈ E(t, ψ) and by (IH), we obtain
(M, w) |= Kyra(φ, ψ). 
Lemma 11. There exists a formula φ ∈ LPAFKy, a model M and w ∈ D(M) such that (M, w) |= φ but
(MF , w) 6|= φ.
Proof. Consider the following model M(reflexive arrows are not shown, but expected)
p, q
t : Kaq
1
t : Kaq
2
p, q
t : Kaq
3
a
a
a
and its factive counterpart MF , where we loose all explanations for Kaq as in every world x, by (M, 2) 6|= q, we
find that (M, x) 6|= Kaq as the relation Ra is total among these worlds:
p, q
1 2
p, q
3
a
a
a
Consider the formula φ := [p]KyaKaq. We have (M, 1) |= φ. For this, first note that (M, 1) |= p. Second,
∀v ∈ W : (1, v) ∈ Ra and (M, v) |= p leaves us with worlds 1, 3. For those, we obtain both instances of
(M|p, v) |= Kaq as [[p]]M = {1, 3} and (M, v) |= q. At last, note that 1, 3 ∈ E(t,Kaq).
At the same time, we have (MF , 1) 6|= φ since, although similarly [[p]]M = {1, 3}, there exits no t ∈ E such that
1, 3 ∈ EF (t,Kaq) as EF (t,Kaq) has to be empty for every t. 
Theorem 4. PAFKy and ELKyr are not equally expressive.
Proof. Suppose that PAFKy and ELKyr are equally expressive. Thus, there exists a translation function t
from formulas of PAFKy to formulas of ELKyr such that φ ≡ φt for any φ ∈ LPAFKy. Then the following
diagram
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(M, w) |= φ
(M, w) |= φt (MF , w) |= φt
(MF , w) |= φ
t t
Lem. 10
may be completed at the top for any φ ∈ LPAFKy, any model M and any w ∈ D(M), which is a contradiction
to Lem. 11. 
Corollary 1. PAFKyr has greater expressivity than ELKyr.8
Proof. Since ELKyr is contained in PAFKyr, it can’t be more expressive. By Thm. 4 and Lem. 11, there
exists a formula φ ∈ LPAFKy which can’t be expressed in ELKyr. As PAFKyr contains PAFKy, via the
association Kyaφ ∼ Kyra(⊤, φ), we have greater expressivity. 
By this argument it can be seen that a relativized knowing-why operator does not suffice to imitate public
announcement behavior in the logic of knowing why, thus leaving a rest of void it initially intended to fill.
Although we leave further inspections for future work, we still want to advocate for the consideration of the use
of non-standard semantics for public announcements, namely context-dependent semantics, which seems like a
promising alternative way of dealing with the laid out problems.
4.1. Using non-standard semantics. The following semantic concepts for public announcement logic are
mainly due to Wang in their current form, see [14] and [12]. For providing a small recollection of the basic
notions of context-dependent semantics of the operator [φ], we consider another semantic relation |=ρ, similar
to the classical |=, but induced with a formula ρ ∈ LPAFKyr providing a specific evaluation context. For the
behavior of this new relation, one may consider the following(only the interesting cases are provided, i.e. the
out-carrying of the relation over ∧,¬ is obviously following the old structure as the main difference lies in the
many-world context).
(M, w) |= φ⇔ (M, w) |=⊤ φ
(M, w) |=ρ p iff w ∈ V (p)
. . .
(M, w) |=ρ Kaφ iff ∀v ∈W : (w, v) ∈ Ra and (M, v) |=⊤ ρ implies (M, v) |=ρ φ
(M, w) |=ρ [ψ]φ iff (M, w) |=⊤ implies (M, w) |=ρ∧ψ φ
As it was shown in [14], the composition axiom in this semantics turns out to be much simpler with
[φ][ψ]χ↔ [φ ∧ ψ]χ
This new induced handling of compositions of public announcement should make it possible to find a simple
reduction axiom like φ → Kyra(φ ∧ ψ, χ) as a proposition. But on deeper insights, the whole idea of a condi-
tionalized versions of the knowing-why operator may(or should) be completely unnecessary in this new context.
The axiomatization and the more intensive study of this semantics in this context are left as future work.
Another use of different semantics may lie in restructuring the semantics of Kyra itself. Such a different
semantic definition shall obviously provide a possibility for translation between the relativized versions and the
versions incorporating the public announcements. This, for example, is enabled by the following semantics:
(M, w) |= Kyra(φ, ψ) iff ∃t ∈ E : ∀v ∈ W : (w, v) ∈ Ra and (M, v) |= φ implies (M|φ,w) |= ψ and v ∈ E(t, ψ)
Obviously, through the enforcement of the φ-restricted model only in the continuing evaluation of φ, we avoid
the problems laid out before. From this, we may translate [φ]Kyaψ to φ → Kyra(φ, ψ), although it seems to
require a quite different approach of axiomatization. Additionally, the usual idea of introducing a relativized
operator to leave the context updated models, is discarded which doesn’t get along with the usual spirit.
5. Conclusions
In this paper, the logic of knowing why under the extension with public announcement operators for for-
mulas was addressed. Through the difficulties arising with providing of a reduction-based axiomatic system,
we considered another logical operator, namely the conditionalized version of the basic Ky-operator to provide
a partial workaround. Following to this, as the main result of this paper, we proved the newly introduced
axiomatic system concerning this logic using the relativized operator as being sound and complete with respect
to the basic S5-class of models following the definition of the initial paper [17]. A conditionalized version of the
8Note, that in a similar way one may obtain a different proof for Thm. 1, using Lem. 9.
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canonical model presented in [17] and [15],[16] is here provided in order to achieve these results. In the following
section, we then considered the problem of expressivity between the different logics in discourse, where we
found that ELKyr does not fulfill its reduction promise as hoped and so lies as an intermediate among ELKy,
PAFKy and PAFKyr concerning its expressive power.
The situation was at first sight similar to the problem of a reduction style axiomatization of common knowl-
edge with public announcement operators(or similar dynamic notions), as examined in [2], [9]. The main
difference and cause for problems to those approaches is the sensitivity of the argument of the knowing why
operator, as the core syntactical structure of a formula is needed for the evaluation of the E-function and we
thus can’t use similar formulas, in the sense of being equal under satisfaction. These problems did not arise
with previous attempts of adding public announcements to other non-standard epistemic logics, e.g. [15], [16],
[11], as the non-classical operators in these contexts concerned objects disconnected from the set of well-formed
formulas and the other classical Kripkean parts of the model definition.
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